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This paper provides a new explanation for Gibson's Paradox —theobser-
vation that the price level and the nominal interest rate were positively cor-
related over long periods of economic history. We explain this phenomenon in
terms of the fundamental workings of a gold standard. Under a gold standard,
the price level is the reciprocal of the real price of gold. Because gold is a
durable asset, its relative price is systematically affected by fluctuations in
the real productivity of capital, which also determine real interest rates.
Our resolution of the Gibson Paradox seems more satisfactory than previous
hypotheses. It explains why the paradox applied to real as well as nominal
rates of return, its coincidence with the gold standard period, and the co—move-
ment of interest rates, prices, and the stock of monetary gold during the gold
standard period. Empirical evidence using contemporary data on gold prices and
real interest rates supports our theory.
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Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Cambridge, MA 02138Monetary theory leads us to expect a correlation between nominal interest
rates and the rate of change, rather than the level, of prices. Yet, as
emphasized by Keynes (1930), two centuries of data do not confirm this
expectation. Between 1730 and 1930, the British consol yield exhibits close
co—movement with the wholesale price index, alongside an essentially zero
correlation with the inflation rate. Keynes referred to the strong positive
correlation between nominal interest rates and the price level, which he called
"Gibson's Paradox, as "one of the most completely established empirical facts
in the whole field of quantitative economics" (Keynes, 1930, vol. 2, p. 198).
Fisher wrote that "no problem in economics has been more hotly debated" (Fisher,
1930, p. 399).
Fisher (1930) attempted to resolve the Gibson Paradox by combining his
relation between nominal rates and expected inflation with the hypothesis that
inflationary expectations were formed as a long distributed lag on past
inflation, with slowly declining weights. Wicksell (1936) and Keynes (1930),
treating the Gibson phenomenon as a correlation between the price index and the
real rate of return, argued that exogenous shifts in the profitability of
capital would be accompanied by accomodative movements in the stocks of inside
and outside money through the behavior of private and central banks. However,
monetary economists have found strong theoretical and empirical grounds for
rejecting both the Fisherian and the Wicksell—Keynes explanations. Other
resolutions of Gibson's Paradox have been proposed as well, but these have
generally been viewed as too ad hoc to rationalize such a persistent phenomenon.
As Friedman and Schwartz (1976, p. 288) conclude, "The Gibson Paradox remains an
empirical phenomenon without a theoretical explanation".
This paper offers a new approach to the Gibson Paradox. Noting the—2—
coinciderce of the Gibson Paradox observation and the gold standard period, we
see the Gibson correlation as a natural concomitant of a monetary standard based
on a durable commodity. Our theoretical explanation revolves around the essen—
t-ial nature of a metallic standard. Since the authorities peg the nominal price
of gold at a constant, the general price level is the reciprocal of the price of
gold in terms of goods. Thus, determination of the general price level amounts
to the microeconomic problem of determining the relative price of gold.
Following treatments of the gold standard by Friedman (1953), and Barro (1979),
we focus on the demand for gold in its real, as well as its monetary, uses.
Using a perfect foresight version of the model of Barro (1979), we are able to
demonstrate that if (as in Wicksell and Keynes) innovations in the productivity
of capital are an important exogenous disturbance, there will be a negative
equilibrium relationship between the relative price of gold and the real
interest rate, giving rise to Gibson's Paradox.
Our theory of the Gibson Paradox is supported by the historical coincidence
of the Gibson Paradox period and the gold standard. It accounts for the
anomalies which plague the Fisher and Keynes-Wicksell theories of the Gibson
correlation. Further support comes from an analysis of contemporary data on
gold pricing. In recent years, gold and other metals prices have moved as our
theory would predict. A final source of supporting evidence is the available
information on monetary and non-monetary gold stocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I documents that the Gibson
correlation between interest rates and the price level is a major feature of
data from the gold standard period. Recent claims by Benjamin and Kochin (1984)
that much of the correlation is spurious and that it is in any event largely a—3—
wartime phenomenon are shown to be unwarranted. We also note to other facts
that a satisfactory theory of the Gibson Paradox must contend with. The Gibson
correlation evaporates in recent decades when a fiat money standard prevailed.
Data on equity yields indicate that the Gibson correlation held for real as well
as nominal assets.
Section II briefly reviews the major existing explanations of the Gibson
Paradox. The Fisher explanation based on inflationary expectations has
difficulty accounting for the correlation of real returns on equity and the
price level. It is also inconsistent with the empirical observation that prices
followeda process veryclose to a random walk during the Gibson Paradox period.
TheKeynes—Wicksellexplanation based on the workings of the banking system
foundersontheobservationthat variation in the American money stock during
thepre—1914period reflected largely variation in the monetary gold stock
ratherthanchangesinthe moneymultiplieror the ratio of outside money to the
goldstock. Other explanations appearinadequate to the phenomenon.
Section IIIpresentsour theory of the Gibson Paradox. The Gibson
correlation arises naturally in a.model of the pricing of gold with a variable
return to capital. We show that our model of gold pricing can rationalize the
anomalies associated with the Fisher and Keynes-Wicksell explanations for
Gibson's Paradox. In the face of real shocks, the price level should be
correlated with real rates of return. Since gold is priced as an asset, the
theorysuggeststhat the price level will follow an approximate random walk.
Finally, the process of substitution between monetary and non-monetary gold
leads the model to predict the observed positive correlation of interest rates,
the monetary gold stock and prices.-4-
Section IV examines the correlation betveen real interest rates and the
relative price of gold during the recent period when the price of gold has
floated freely. The negative correlation between real interest rates and the
real price of gold that forms the basis for our theory is a dominant feature of
actual gold price fluctuations. Similar findings are obtained using an index of
non-ferrous metal prices.
Section V returns to the gold standard period and examines the scanty
available data on the stocks of monetary and non-monetary gold. Contemporaneous
accounts suggest the importance of conversions of gold between rnonetar'y and
non-monetary uses. Some very weak statistical evidence suggests that the share
of gold held in monetary form was an increasing function of the interest rate,
as predicted by our model.
Section VI presents some concluding remarks.
I.Gibson's Paradox inWorldData, 1730 to 1938
This section examines world data on commodity prices, long-term interest
rates, and stock yields in an effort to characterize Gibsor's Paradox. We
confirm that there is a Gibson Paradox to be explained; it is not merely a
spurious correlation between two random walks. Then, using stock yield data, we
argue that Gibson's Paradox involved the underlying real rate of return, and not
merely the nominal yield on financial assets.
Data
The raw price data that we work with consist of wholesale price indices for
four countries: Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. The U.S.—5—
series is the all—items WPI from Warren and Pearson (1933). The British data
are from Mitchell and Deane (1962), and were assembled by linking the Elizabeth
Schumpeter Index with the annual average oftheGayer, Rostow, and Schwartz
Monthly Index of British Commodity Prices, and then (beginning in 1846) the
Sauerbeck-Statist Overall Price Index. The French and German indices are from
Mitchell (1978). The series are based heavily on listed prices for
institutional purchasers, and tend to emphasize internationally traded goods.
Table 1 presents a correlation matrix for the four countries' prices for the
years 1870 to 1913.
Table 1
Britain France Germany U.S.
Britain 1
France .94 1
Germany .65 .81 1
U.s. .85 .94 .81 1
For the years 1820 to 1870, British and French prices are almost as highly
correlated as in the later period. Germany, however, is rather out of line with
the other countries before 1870. The correlations of prices across countries
do appear to be high enough to make the notion of a "world price level" a
meaningful one.
For our purposes, it is not necessary to pass judgment on whether the
price levels of the various countries were held in line with one another only by
laborious specie flows, as argued by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), or by-6-
'Continuous arbitrage in goods" (McCloskey and Zecher, 1976). Most theories of
the Gibson Paradox refer to the common movements in the various price series. We
thus construct a "world price level" as a weighted average of the annual
wholesale price series of the individual Countries. The weights are from
Bairoch (1982), which attempts to proxy total manufacturing output of a number
of countries for the years 1860 and 1913. We exclude the U.S. data during the
Civil War perod. Although Bairoch's tables are an extremely rough guide to
relative GNP's, none of our results are sensitive to the choice of weights.
Probably because of the predominant role of traded goods in the wholesale price
indices, the correlation of our world price series with the British series is an
extraordinary .96. In all of the statistical manipulations reported below, very
similar results are obtained using either the world or the British price level.
The degree of capital mobility between countries continues to be a
controversial issue, with regard to both historical and current data. Because
taking a weighted average of interest rates across countries would be an
exercise with no clear interpretation, we treat the British consol rate (from
Homer, 1977) as a measure of the world long—term interest rate.1London was
the undisputed center of the world capital market during the gold standard, and
capital flows to and from London were prodigious (see the papers in Bordo and
Schwartz, 1984).
Was There A Gibson's Paradox?
Data on world prices and interest rates are plotted in Figure 1. To the
naked eye a clear positive relationship between interest rates and prices appears
observable. Nonetheless, Benjamin and Kochin (1984) raise two questions about—6a—
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the existence and scope of Gibson's Paradox. First, they note that both prices
and interest rates were close to random walks, and thus the risk of spurious
correlation -is high. Second, they allege that to the extent Gibson's Paradox -is
present at all, it is primarily a wartime phenomenon. We consider these issues
in turn.
The spurious regression argument, as developed by Granger and Newbold (1974)
and Plosser and Schwert (1978), has two parts. Under certain circumstances, when
two random walks are regressed, the regularity conditions for least squares
may be violated. In this case, estimated coefficients and confidence intervals
will be meaningless. Moreover, even when the coefficient estimates are
meaningful, the associated standard errors are likely to be underestimated by a
factor of five or more. These authors also demonstrate that standard serial
correlation corrections are inadequate when error processes involve unit roots.
A standard diagnostic procedure recommended explicitly by Granger and
Newbold (1977) is estimation in first differences. Gibson regressions estimated
-in this way are presented below. Estimation in first differences, however,
presents its own statistical problems. Measurement error in the regressors is
likely to lead to far more serious errors in differenced regressions than in
level regressions. Anderson (1971) demonstrates that differencing accentuates
high frequency variation in data at the expense of low frequency variation.
Given the inevitable uncertainties surrounding the exact timing of the
relationship, estimation techniques which focus on low frequency variations are
to be preferred.
For these reasons, we also perform regressions relating the levels of
prices and interest rates. The simulation studies of Granger and Newbold (1974,—8—
1977) provide some rough guidance as to the correct critical levels for
rejection of the null hypothesis that two random walks are independent. They
suggest that, with fifty observations, an ordinary "t—statistic" greater than 10
or so (corresponding to an R2 of about .7) would properly lead to a rejection at
the 90 to 95 percent level. This suggests that the estimated standard errors
should be inflated by fivefold or a little more.
Table 2 reports Gibson regressions for various subperiods of 1720 to 1938.
Because of the difficulties inherent in finding consistent price series before
and after WWI for several countries, the world price series was constructed only
for the years 1821 to 1913. Regressions using British data are reported for
periods outside of this band. The regressions in both levels and differences
are shown.
The first period, 1729 to 1819, provides ambiguous evidence as to whether
or not Gibsorts Paradox holds in these years. In differences, the estimate is
slightly negative. In levels, the regression is nearly significant at the five
percent level. The closeness of the estimated coefficient to that for 181 to
1913 may give one further pause in concluding that the regression is spurious.
The period 1821 to 1913, on the other hand, as well as its various
subperiods, exhibits the Gibson correlation both in levels and in first
difference form. This period is described by Bordo (1981) as the "classical
gold standard". The beginning of the period marks the resumption of specie
payments by Britain after the Napoleanic Wars, and the beginning of nearly a
century of an essentially uninterrupted gold standard. The end of the period
is, of course, the last year before World War I, which was accompanied by
indefinite suspension of specie payments by most countries. In the regression—8a—
Table 2: Regression of Logar-ithm of Pr-ice Level













































































































in levels, the ordinary t—statistic is in excess of 10 with an R2 of .71, thus
exceeding the five percent critical level implied by the Granger and Newbold
(1974, 1977) simulation studies. In differenced form, the t—statistic of 3.5 is
significant at the one percent level. Thus Gibson's Paradox characterizes the
classical gold standard. Note, in particular, the stability of the regression in
differences over the various subsamples.
On any criterion, there is a marked positive correlation between prices and
the interest rate during World War I. This is exactly what one would expect
from a dramatic increase in government purchases accompanied by a large
expansion of the (fiat) money stock. What is striking is not the rather easily
explicable wartime correlation but the highly persistent, stable, and far more
puzzling relationship during the peacetime gold standard years. It was clearly
the latter that captured the attention of Keynes (1930), who emphasized the long
period over which Gibson's Paradox apparently held. Friedman and Schwartz
(1982), too, regard Gibson's Paradox as almost entirely a gold standard
phenomenon:
For the period our data cover [1880 to 1976), it [Gibson's
•Paradox] holds clearly and unambiguously for the United States
and the United Kingdom only for the period from 1880 to
1914, and less clearly for the interwar period [p. 586].
The final entry in Table 2 covers the interwar period 1920 to 1938. Most
of this period was characterized by a return to gold, and these regressions are
consistent with those from the prewar gold standard period.
Is There Still a Gibson Paradox?
An important question, and a frequent source of confusion, is whether or
not Gibson's Paradox persists into the post—World War II period. Some authors-10—
have concluded that it does, on the basis of raw correlations alone. This is
inappropriate for a period during which the price level rose in every year. To
establish an economically meaningful Gibson Paradox, one would need to show that
when the rate of inflation slowed (remaining positive, however), the interest
rate continued to rise with the price level. That this was not the case is
clearly seen in Figure 2.2 As becomes especially clear after 1965, the interest
rate follows the rate of inflation rather than the price level.
Gibson's Paradox and Real Rates
In explaining Gibson's paradox it is critical to determine whether it
applies to nominal or to real rates of return. Below we present indirect
evidence that the paradox applies to real rates of return by arguing that
nominal interest rates during the gold standard period did not incorporate
inflation premia. Here we present more direct evidence by looking at equity
yields. We examine both earnings/price and dividend/price ratios. The former
reflect total returns to shareholders. The latter have the virtue that they are
less likely to be distorted by transitory developments.
We rely on the composite dividend and earnings yields given in Cowles
(1939). These data are available only after 1871. Table 3 reports regressions
involving the yields, in level and first differences, comparable to the
regressions in Table 2. The coefficients of the regressions in levels are
always positive, with conventional "t—statistics" typically between 5 and 15.
The dividend yield regressions for 1872 to 1913, in particular, yield large con-
ventional t-statistics. The estimated coefficients do tend to be smaller than























I I I I
1950 1955196019651970-lOb-
Price evel on CclesCommisionStock Y?idS
Levels,'FirstCefficient of D—W









































Table 3: Regression of Logarithm of
Sample PeriodPrice Series Yield





































0.05 .05Table 3. Continued
1921—1938* British DPR Levels .11 0.44 .15
(.05)
1st Differences —.01 0.75 .00
(.03)
U.S. Levels .03 0.27—.00
(.03)
1st Differences -.03 0.94 .17
(.01)
British EPR Levels .05 0.73 .44
(.01)
1st Differences .02 0.85 .16
(.01)
U.S. Levels .03 0.58 .47
(.01)
1st Differences .01 0.87 .42
(.00)
*Th world price series covers only 1821 to 1913. See p.8 in text.—11—
coefficients are significantly positive in half of the cases, insignificant in
the remainder. Overall, the regressions support the view that Gibson's Paradox
involved the real rate.
An alternative to using dividend or earnings yields as a measure of the
required real return on equity is to construct an "internal rate of return"
variable using forecasts of future dividends.To implement this approach, we
first estimated rolling bivariate autoregressions for real dividends and real
stock prices (using the composite data from Cowles, 1939), and used these to
generate k—step-ahead forecasts of aggregate real dividend payments. For each
year, we then solved iteratively for the value R* that would discount the
predicted future dividends to the current stock price. The resulting discount
rate series can be interpreted as a dividend/price ratio adjusted f or cyclical
fluctuations and trend growth in dividends. Regressions of the commodity price
indices on this variable yielded almost identical results to those using the
dividend/price ratio.
We conclude this section with a summary of the empirical findings about
Gibson's Paradox that theory should seek to explain.
1. There is a Gibson's Paradox which is more than spurious correlation between
two random walks.
2. Far from being primarily a wartime phenomenon, Gibson's Paradox characterizes
the gold standard years 1821 to 1913, which were free from major conflicts, and
is quite stable during, this period. The gold standard represents the only long
period over which the Gibson correlation holds continuously.—12—
3. Gibson's Paradox had clearly vanished by the 1970's. It apparently held more
weakly before the advent of the classical gold standard in 1821 than after it.
4. The paradox appears to involve the real rate. As we argue in Section II
below, most of the variation in nominal yields should probably be attributed to
real rate variation. Regressions using the Cowles stock yield data suggest that
the price level was correlated with the expected return on capital.
II. Existing Resolutions oftheGibson Paradox
As noted by Keynes (1930), the simplest explanation of the Gibson
correlation, while logically consistent, can be rather easily disposed of
empirically. Consider the full employment IS-LM model (see,e.g.Mundell,
1971). If a shifting IS locus is coupled with a relatively stable LM curve, a
positive correlation between prices and interest rates will be observed. The
problem with this solution to the Gibson riddle is that it implies that
important long-run price changes were due to interest-induced movements in
velocity. Keynes (1930) found variation in velocity insufficient to account for
more than a fraction of the low-frequency price changes that are the subject of
Gibson's Paradox. More detailed quantitative analysis (see, e.g. Cagan, 1965;
Schwartz, 1973; Siegel and Shiller, 1977) supports this view, finding instead
that long—run price variation was closely associated with changes in the money
stock, and hence LM shifts.
The Fisher Explanation
The best-known explanation of Gibson's Paradox is that of Fisher (1930).
Suppose that expected inflation is formed as a long distributed lag on past—13—
inflation. If the weights decline sufficiently siowly, expected inflation will
resemble the price level more closely than it resembles the contemporaneous rate
of inflation. Thus a positive correlation between nominal interest rates and
the price level could arise from the theoretical Fisher relation in combination
with a particular process for inflationary expectations. Movements in the real
rate of interest play no role in Fisher's resolution.
Sargent (1973) challenged the Fisher explanation on the grounds that it
appears inconsistent with rationality, given the process actually followed by
inflation. If Fisher is correct (under the assumption that the real rate was
nearly constant), the regression of the nominal interest rate on past inflation
ought to resemble the regression of inflation on its own past. However,
inflation was largely serially uncorrelated during the Gibson Paradox period,
leading Sargent to reject this cross—equation restriction. During the gold
standard years, a forecast of zero inflation each year would have been superior
to Fisher's scheme in terms of cx post rationality (Siegel and Shiller, 1977;
see also Barsky, 1984).
Table 4 presents estimates of the autocorrelations of inflation for
various periods. While there is some weak evidence of negative serial.
correlation, the inflation rate appears to be close to white noise, implying
that the price level was close to a random walk. Note that in the presence of
negative serial correlation in inflation one would expect, if anything, a nega-
tive correlation between prices and interest rates on the basis of Fisher's
logic. Given the unpredictability of inflation, it seems unlikely that fluctu-
ations in interest rates reflected variation in inflationary expectations to an
appreciable extent.3 Shiller and Siegel (1977) appear to be correct in claiming-13a-
Table 4: Estimated Autocorrelation Function of
First-Oifferenced Log Price Level
(annual data)
Price Asymptotic Sample Autocorrelations
Sample PeriodSeriesStd. ErrorLags
1821—1913 World .10 1—6 .17 —.01 —.16 —.27 —.17 .05
7—12 .23 .10 .03.03 —.02 —.23
British 1—6 .15 —.12 —.12 —.21 —.18.07
7—12 .22 .09 .09.03 —.02 —.18
1821—1869 World .14 1—6 .14 -.08 —.23 —.29 -.20 .10
7—12 .21.09 —.05 —.07 -.05 -.26
British 1—6 .10 —.14 —.13 —.25 —.24 .10
7—12 .19 .07.02 -.02 -.07 —.28
1870—1913 World .15 1—6 .24 .18.03 —.23 —.12 —.16
7—12.24 .16 .27 .28.01 —.08
British 1—6 .26 —.08 —.08 —.10 -.05 —.01
7—12 .31 .13 .20 .18.10 —.05
U.S. 1—6—.07 .01.11 -.11 -.03 —.06
7—12 .21 .10 .09 .15.10 —.13—14—
that variation in nominal rates during this period should be regarded as
variation in real rates. This judgment is further supported by Barsky's
(forthcoming) finding that dividend yields and earnings yields moved essentially
one for one with Macaulay's adjusted nominal yield on U.S. long term bonds
during the pre-1930 period.
A second implication of Fisher's resolution is that the Gibson correlation
ought only to characterize nominal interest rates, not the real return to
capital or the yields on common stocks. This proposition was tested and
rejected in the previous section, where we found that proxies for the real
return to capital displayed a relationship to prices similar to the relationship
between prices and nominal yields. This corroborates the findings of Sargent
(1973), who applied a somewhat different test to these data andreacheda
parallel conclusion.
The Keynes—Wicksell Explanation
The major class of alternatives to Fisher's explanation is associated with
the names of Wicksell (1936) and Keynes (1930). Both saw exogenous innovations
in the productivity of capital as the underlying forcing variable. Wicksell
(1936) argued that an increase in the "natural rate" of interest would be
accompanied both by an increase in bank lending and a gradual rise in the
nominal yield on financial instruments. As the stock of (inside) money
expanded, prices would rise, and this would probably occur while the "market"
interest rate was still rising to the equilibrium "natural rate". The
Wicksellian theory is rather flatly refuted by the evidence in Cagan (1965) that
changes in high-powered money, not bank loans, were responsible for the long—run—15—
pricemovements that are relevant in discussions of the Gibson phenomenon (see
also Shiller and Siegel, 1977).
Keynes (1930) argued that central banks acted to finance expansions in real
activity and that this could explain the movements in high-powered money not
accounted for in the theory of Wicksell. Building on the Keynesian analysis,
Shiller and Siegel (1977) argue that wars, in particular, were financed by a
combination of high—powered money and interest-bearing debt, raising both the
price level and interest rates.4 Although possibly an accurate picture of World
War I experience, this argument has less appeal for the years of the classical
gold standard (1821 to 1913, say, for the U.K., 1879 to 1913 for the U.S.), the
key Gibson Paradox period. Cagan (1965), addressing the arguments of both
Keynes (1930) and Wicksell (1936) in an exhaustive study of the determinants of
the U.S. money stock, reports:
Neither changes in banks' reserve ratios nor in the ratio of
the domestic gold stock to high—powered money account for
any sizable part of the long—run movements in the U.S. money
stock before 1914 [p. 254].
Neither (Wicksell nor Keynes) realized how fully the
cumulative effect of changes in the U.S. gold stock5
accounted for the variations in growth of the money stock of
the United States (and probably of all gold—standard
countries) up to World War I... .[p. 255].
Cagan's results imply that any theory of the relationship between prices and
interest under the gold standard ought to work through the monetary gold stock.
Below we present a model which follows Keynes and Wicksell in regarding shocks
to the productivity of capital as the driving force behind Gibson's Paradox, but
which allows them to work through the monetary gold stock.—16—
Other Explanations
The remaining explanations of Gibson's Paradox involve the redistributional
effects of major, unanticipated price changes (Macaulay, 1938; Siegel, 1975;
Shiller and Siegel, 1977). The best-developed argument based on distribution
effects (Siegel, 1975; Shiller and Siegel, 1977) distinguishes between agents
desiring net short positions in nominal debt and those choosing net long posi-
tions. An unanticipated rise in the price level redistributes wealth toward
borrowers, raising the desired supply of debt, while reducing the willingness of
the creditor group to hold debt. The resulting excess supply of nominal bonds
means that the interest rate must rise to restore capital market equilibrium.
There are a number of problems with the Shiller-Siegel approach. First, as
noted by Shiller and Siegel (1977) and Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 567-8),
the ability of this reasoning to account for the correlations in the data is
highly sensitive to assumptions about the timing of the effects. This is
especially serious given the low frequency nature of the Gibson phenomenon.
Second, Shiller and Siegel do not suggest that the wealth effects of
unanticipated price changes can account for increases in equity yields. Third,
no direct or indirect empirical support has been adduced for this explanation.
Contemporary evidence certainly does not support SMiler and Siegel's prediction
that unanticipated inflation should raise real interest rates.
Our survey of alternative explanations for Gibson's Paradox finds none of
them entirely satisfactory. In addition to the limitations noted already, none
can explain why only the gold standard years show clear evidence of the Gibson
correlation. We address this question in the next section. Our proposed
resolution of the Gibson Paradox relies on the workings of the gold standard.—17—
Italso permits us to resolve the anomalies raised bytheFisher and
Keynes-Wicksell explanations.
III. A Theory of the Real Price of Gold and the World Price Level
This section develops a simple perfect foresight model of the determination
of the real price of gold, and hence the general price level, under a gold
standard. We then discuss the time series properties of the model under various
disturbances to the real rate of return. Formally, the model describes a
closed, full employment economy, which is best thought of as the world economy
under fixed exchange rates and fully flexible prices. The model is very close
to that of Barro (1979), except that it replaces the partial adjustment, static
expectations formulation of that paper with a perfect foresight, equilibrium
treatment.
For our purposes, a gold standard is defined as the maintenance of full
convertibility between gold and dollars at a fixed ratio. The gold backing of
the money stock need not be one—for—one. Money consists of bank deposits and,
for simplicity, there are no gold coins. The fixed nominal price of gold
impliesthatdetermining the general price level is equivalent to determining
the equilibrium relative price of gold. We set the nominal price of gold equal
to unity for convenience. The real price of gold is then Pg =l/P,where P is
the general price level.
Gold is a highly durable asset, and thus, as stressed by Levhari and
Pindyck (1981), the demand for the existing stock (as opposed to the new flow)
must be modelled. The willingness to hold the stock of gold depends on the rate
of return available on alternative assets. We assume that the alternative assets-18—
arephysical capital with (instantaneous) real rate of return r, and nominal
bonds with (instantaneous) nominal return i =r+P/P=r—
Pg/Pg.The real
rate of return is exogenous to the model, but subject to shocks. These shocks
reflect changes in the actual or perceived productivity of capital as envisioned
by Keynes and Wicksell.
The Model
The gold stock G is held in two forms: as bank reserves (denoted Gm), and
as nonmonetary gold (denoted E3). Nonmonetary gold (best thought of as jewelry,
objects of art, etc.) is held partly for its service flow or "dividend", which
is denoted D(G), with D' < 0. Consumers equate the service flow 0(G) to the
user cost rPgPg (we assume no depreciation), so that at all times the real
gold price must satisfy:
(1) g =rPgD(G).
Because g =(/P)Pgi(1) can also be written as:
•(1') D(G)/P9 =1,
where i is the nominal interest rate. Equation (1') makes clear that agents rent
the services of nonmonetary gold at the nominal interest rate. However, since r
is the exogenous forcing variable in this model, (1) is, for most purposes, the
more useful formulation.
The monetary side consists of a conventional demand for real balances
(2) M/P =L(i)=L(r—g/Pg),L' < 0,
and a relation between monetary gold reseves and the money stock:-19-
(3) M =4.1Gm.
where jiisa fixed parameter. Equating (2) and (3), and using P =i/Pgyields
(4) Gm =L(r—g/Pg)/i.iPg
Substituting (4) into (1) yields a locus in PgG space along which the real





It is trivial to verify that the Pg =0locus is downward—sloping.
To close the model, it is necessary to specify the evolution of the total
gold stock. We assume that the rate at which gold is mined is an increasing
function of its real price and a decreasing function of the quantity of gold
that has already been mined, reflecting the depletion of easily mined ores.
That IS:
(6) a= Y(PgtG)7 >0, <0
Equation (6) implies that the=0locus is upward sloping in PgG space.
Figure 3 shows the steady state where Pg =G=0and the dynamic behavior
of the model out of steady state. The system is saddle—point stable.
The Effects of an Increase in the Real Interest Rate
Now consider the response to an exogenous increase in the real rate of
return r. The general effect is, of course, a reduced willingness to hold both
monetary and non—monetary gold, which appears as a downward shift of the g =0
locus. Figure 4 analyzes the case where the rise in r is unanticipated, but
understood to be permanent once it occurs.6 There is an immediate drop in thePg
—19 a-
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real price of gold (i.e. a rise in the price level), due both to an increase in
monetary velocity and to the monetization of some non—monetary gold holdings.
Since the newsteadystate will have a lower total gold stock, the initial jump
in the price level actually overshoots the steady state. The real price of gold
exhibits serially correlated increases as the gold stock gradually falls to its
new equilibrium level. Of course, the price level returns only part way back to
its level before the shock. If the=0locus is nearly vertical,7 the
partial retreat of the price level will be strongly overshadowed by its initial
jump.
Figure 4-b depicts the time paths of the general price level (P =l/Pg).
the (exogenous) real interest rate, and the (endogenous) nominal interest rate.
Although the positive jump in r is accompanied by the onset of expected
deflation, analysis of equation (1') in conjunction with (4) shows that there
must be a positive jump in i as well. For suppose the nominal rate did not
rise. Since Pg has fallen, 06n must fall (by at least as much,
proportionately). With G fixed at a point in time, a fall in D(G) requires a
reduction in But with lower i and higher P, monetary equilibrium requires
an increase in Thus the nominal interest rate and the price level jump
together. Clearly they are positively correlated across steady states. During
the transition, however, while the system is moving along the new saddle path,
the two variables do not move together.
Now consider a transitory shock to the real rate, an unanticipated rise in
r which is to persist for some known duration and to be followed by a return to
the previously prevailing rate (see Figure 5). The initial price jump is
followed by a movement alongside the stable arm associated with the higher r.Unanticipated,
-20a-
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This is a period of declining gold stocks and resultant deflation. While the
real rate is still transitorily high, the system enters an explosive phase with
further deflation (increases in the real gold price), but now a rising stock of
gold. This replenishing of the gold supply is in preparation for the return to
a lower real interest rate. When the lower rate is restored, the system arrives
on the stable arm associated with the original g =o locus.Because the gold
stock is still below its steady state, the "dividend yield" exceeds r along the
saddle path. The inflation that takes place along this path provides the
necessary real capital loss on gold to bring its user cost up to its marginal
service yield.
Figure 5—b shows the time paths of the variables, as for the previous case,
but with the addition of the long—term rate I. The nominal rate and the price
level do jump together (for the same reason given above), but otherwise this
case does not yield a Gibson Paradox. Two of the three segments of the
adjustment paths involve a negative correlation between I and P, a
characteristic (as we have seen) of the saddle paths. The long—term rate
actually does not display much variation at all, because of the transitory
nature of the short rate movements.
The analysis of this section suggest that, under a gold standard also
characterized by shocks to the real interest rate, the interest rate and the
price level should exhibit strong positive correlation across steady states. It
also suggests that, outside of the steady state, the two variables will move
together often, but by no means always. Thus Gibson's Paradox should be more
striking as a long-run phenomenon than as one apparent at the high frequencies.
Note that there is little tendency for a Fisher effect to appear in the-22-
model when the underlying shocks are disturbances to the real rate. While i
sometimes moves in the same direction as expected inflation, most of the
movements in the nominal rate are indicative of real rate variation. Because
the price level does display some serially correlated movements during
adjustment processes, expected inflation is not always zero, and the price level
is not literally a random walk. However, the price level will be close to a
random walk if most shocks to the required rate of return are unanticipated and
permanent, and if the Ô= 0locus is nearly vertical.
Of course, by no means all conceivable shocks involve the real interest
rate, and we do not argue that other disturbances were not also important
determinants of the price level during the gold standard period. A "gold
discovery" appears in the model as an outward shift of the v(PgiG) function.
This shifts the Ô= 0locus to the right, raising the steady state price level
and gold stock, and leaving the interest rate in long-run equilibrium unchanged.
During the transition period, the model exhibits a Fisher effect. Since an
initial jump in the price level (the "announcement" effect of a gold discovery)
is followed by further, anticipated inflation, a positive correlation between
the nominal interest rate and prices does result. The correlation works
entirely through the Fisher relation, and thus cannot be the principal
explanation of Gibson's Paradox. This mechanism does, however, reinforce the
tendency towards positive correlation between prices and interest rates.
Note that there is, by definition, no such thing as steady state inflation
in this model of a gold standard. Unlike fiat money, which can be printed
without limit by the authorities, the monetary gold stock tends toward constancy
over time, and this alone makes inflations self-limiting. Since we rule out the—23—
possibility that the system remains forever on an explosive path, the real price
of gold tends toward its equilibrium value based on fundamentals. The absence
of ongoing, steady state inflation should, however, in no way be confused with
price stability. The long asset duration of gold, which makes its equilibrium
value sensitive to the real interest rate, combined with unanticipated gold
discoveries, may make the price level particulary volatile under this regime.
Our model provides an explanation for the Gibson's Paradox observation and
for its coincidence with the gold standard period. It also accounts for the
anomalies that have been raised in discussions of alternative resolutions of
Gibson's Paradox. Our model relies on real shocks as a driving force and thus
unlike the Fisher explanation, it is consistent with the finding that Gibson's
correlation is observed using proxies for real rates of return. Our resolution
also addresses the principal weakness of the Keynes-Wicksell explanations of the
Gibson Paradox --theapparent close linkage between the price level and the
stock of monetary gold. In our formulation, the productivity of capital,
through its effect on the cost of holding non—monetary gold, is a key
determinant of the monetary gold stock.
In the next section we use recent data to document that the real interest
rate is in fact a dominant determinant of the real price of gold. Then we turn
to a direct examination of substitution between monetary and non—monetary uses
of gold.
IV. Real Interest Rates and the Relative Price
of Gold, 1973 to 1984
The theory of the price level under a gold standard in Section III is
essentially a general theory of the relative price of gold. Omitting the—24-
monetary demand for gold, we see that the theory continues to go through in the
same fashion. Thus an important test of the model is to see how well it
accounts for movements in the relative price of gold (and other metals) outside
the context of a gold standard. The properties of the inverse relativeprices
of metals today ought to be similar to the properties of the general price level
during the gold standrd years.
We focus on the period from 1973 to the present, after the gold market was
sufficiently free from government pegging operations and from limitations on
private trading for there to be a genuine "market" price of gold. Note first
that the real gold price from this period is very nearly a random walk.8 In
this section we show that the real gold price, as well as the relative price of
an index of nonferrous metals, displays marked negative correlation with the
real interest rate. The results for nonferrous metals insure that our findings
do not reflect the "safe haven" quality often attributed to gold.
In order to study long-term real rates in recent years, we require fore-
casts of inflation over a horizon appropriate to a long-term bond. Fortunately,
Box-Jenkins analysis suggests that the inflation rate in the 1970's is well
modelled as an IMA(1,1) process. This stochastic process, resulting from a mix—
ture of permanent and transitory shocks (Muth, 1960), yields the same k—step
ahead forecast for all horizons k1 (see Sargent, 1979, p. 265). Thus the
one-step—ahead forecast of inflation from an IMA(1,1) model has an interpreta-
tion as "permanent expected inflation". The forecasts are based on a "rolling
ARIMA" procedure, so that only information available as of the forecast date is
used. For each forecast date, the information set is taken to be inflation for
the past ten years, so that 40 quarterly observations are used in each estima-—25—
tion. To form an expected real interest rate variable, the inflation forecast
is subtracted from the nominal yield on government securities at constant
maturity of 20 years.
Figure 6 displays the (log) inverse real gold price and our estimate of the
expected pre-tax real interest rate. The strong co—movement over the longer
cycles is reminiscent of Gibson's Paradox. Variation in the real interest rate
appears to be responsible for much of the year—to-year movement in the relative
price of gold. After 1980, inflation exhibits increased volatility, and the
ARIMA forecast is less satisfactory. Some of the variation in our proxy for the
expected real yield on bonds ought to be regarded as spurious. Also, it is
clear that from 1980 onward, the relative price of gold is higher for any given
real interest rate than it was during the 1970's. This is as it should be.
Real interest rates are not the only determinant of the relative price of gold.
Yet the impression that real rates have been high since 1981, and that these
high rates have been associated with a low relative price of gold vis a vis the
1980 level is unmistakable.9
A regression of the log real gold price on our long-term real interest
rate, allowing a separate constant term for the post-1980 period, yields:
log(GoldPrice/CPI) =4.54+.84Postl98O -.06RealR,
(.03) (.06) (.01)
The data strongly reject constancy of the intercept term before
The slope estimate, however, is quite stable across subperiods.
tax real interest rate strengthens our results, for the reasons
Feldstein (1980).












































































































































































































































interest rates to depress the prices of durable assets, and not some peculiarity
of the gold market, we also examine the behavior of other metals prices. Figure
7 shows our long-term real interest rate variable with the level of the PPI
index of nonferrous metals prices relative to the CPI. The results are, if
anything, even more striking than those for gold, providing further support for
the asset pricing approach to metals prices.
V.Monetary and Nonmonetary Gold Stocks
The essence of the model in Section III is a negative equilibrium
relationship between the real price of gold (inverse general price level) and
the real interest rate when the underlying forcing variable is the real rate.
How is this relationship consistent with the quantity theory, which ascribes
price movements to changes in the quantity of money, and which we take to be the
proper description of longer—run price changes? The answer must be that
interest—induced variation in the demand for gold as a durable good (i.e.
nonmonetary gold) is an important source of variation in the monetary gold
stock. Coin can be melted for conversion into art objects, and non—monetary
stocks can be coined or brought to the bank in exchange for deposits. Over time,
there is choice as to the allocation of newly mined gold between monetary and
non-monetary use.
The canonical model of the world price level under a gold standard, as
developed by Friedman (1951) and Barro (1979), and reflected in Section IV of
this paper, involves substitution between monetary and nonmonetary gold as a
prominent feature. Much informal discussion of the gold standard, however,-2 6a-
Figure 7
The (Pre-tax) Real Interest Rate and the Inverse
Relative Price of Nonferrous Metals







appears to embody the presumption that the production of new gold was a
sufficient statistic for changes in the monetary gold stock. The goal of this
section is to highlight the role of nonmonetary gold in the workings of the gold
standard.
Contemporary observers of the gold standard regarded changes in nonmonetary
demand as something to be ignored only at ones's peril in attempts to relate
movement in gold stocks to commodity prices. Probably the best known student of
world gold stocks, Joseph Kitchin (see Kitchin, 1930a and 1930b), writes:
For the purpose of the work of this group, the annual
addition to gold money is of more importance than the annual
addition to the gold output and 'it is therefore necessary to
go into the matter of consumption, especially so far as that
consumption is the result of demand and is not automatic.
When new gold is produced and comes into the market, the
industrial arts, together with India and to some extent
China, lay claim to a large proportion of it, and the
balance, from the nature of things, goes automatically to
swell the amount of gold money. That is, in practice the
manufacturers of money have no say as to what those
additions to their stock should be, and no matter whether
the balance after the satisfying of demand is large or
small, the manufactures of money have to accept it, whether
they will or no (1930b, p.61].
I think one can test the correspondence between
money and prices much better by comparing prices, not with
the total stock of gold,, but with the stock of gold money
(1930b, p.66].
Writing fifty years earlier, Del Mar (1880) strikes much the same note:
Upon a general review of the subject it would appear that
now, at least, not coin, but the arts, are the first and
1principal attraction that determines the distribution of the
precious metals, and that it is only after the demand for
the arts has been satisfied that the supplies of specie are
permitted to accumulate as coin (p. 188].
Even dramatic gold inflations were not always due to new discoveries or
production (as opposed to monetization of existing gold stocks), as illustrated
in the following remark by Stamp (1932):—28-
Then there is also a great deal of gold not now in monetary
use which perhaps could be made available. There is an
immense stock of precious metals in India, which has been
buried out of sight, but I do not know what its extent is or
what the possibilities are of bringing it back. The
greatest change in price levels, that which followed the
discovery of the Americas, was not due to the flow of gold
into Europe from mines, but to the accumulated stocks which
were looted from the temples and sent home to Spain and
Italy and so into the main trade channels of Europe. The
price levels went up first in the near countries and then in
the remote, so that to read of it is like watching a
coloured liquid flowing into a bowl of clear liquid and
gradually colouring the whole of it (p. 3].
The only available estimates of world stocks of monetary and nonmonetary
gold are those of Kitchin (1930a,b) who attempted to adjust his estimates of the
monetary gold stock for the flow of gold into nonmonetary uses. Kitchin com-
puted his estimates of the change in the monetary stock by subtracting from
world gold production an estimate of the net demand (expressed as a flow) by
India and the industrial arts in each year. Kitchin did not attempt to deal
with "re—used" gold at all, and his numbers on new gold bought for fabrication
appear artificially smooth, as noted by Rockoff (1984). Because he assumed that
nonmonetary demand did not vary a great deal, Kitchin essentially constrained
the change in the monetary gold stock to reflect mainly new gold production.
Ilawtrey (1932), in reviewing Kitchin's work, concluded:
It is probable that there has been a fairly steady leakage
from the monetary to the non-monetary side which is not
disclosed in the statistics of industrial consumption... (p. 71)
Kitchin's estimates were challenged by Edie (1929), who attempted a direct
count of the gold in world central banks in two benchmark years. In Edie's
words:
During the past fifteen years, the average annual gross
product of the gold mines has been $392,000,000. This
figure is derived from reasonably accurate reports to the-29—
Director of the Mint of the United States. Of thissum,
$270,000,000 has annually been drawn off into hoarding or
the industrial arts, leaving only $122,000,000 formonetary
use. In other words, only 30 per cent has become available
as money; the remaining 70 per cent has been drawn off into
other uses.
According to this calculation, Mr. Kitchin has credited
monetary stocks with nearly double the amount of new gold
which actually has been added to them tEdie, 1929,PP. 34-35].
While these data seem unlikely to revealany movements in the share of
monetary gold in total gold, it is nonetheless tempting to test our theory of
the Gibson correlation by examining the relationship between the shareof gold
held in monetary form and the interest rate. Ourtheory would predict a
positive relationship, since increases in the interest rate make holding
nonmonetary gold more costly. A regression of the ratio of monetary gold to the
total gold stock on the consol rate and a time trend for theperiod 1850 to 1910
yields:
Mongold/Goldstock =.23+.002time +.060Consol Yield,R2 =.52
(.04) (.000) (.013) OW =.12
While confirming our theory, this result should not be taken tooseriously
because of the problems in data construction and the high degree of
autocorrelation exhibited by the residuals. Given the weakness of the data,
more elaborate statistical technique seems inappropriate. In particular,
differencing to take account of autocorrelation would produce largely noise. An
attempt to construct better series on monetary and nonmonetary stocks from
primary sources might conceivably be a direction for further research.
Otherwise future research will have to focus on less direct implications of our
theory of the Gibson Paradox.-30-
VI.Summary and Conclusion
The famous positive correlation between prices and interest rates seen in
two centuries of data appears far less mysterious when thought of as a negative
equilibrium relationship between the real price of gold and the real interest
rate.In this paper we have presented evidence along several dimensions for the
view that this may be a fruitful approach to understanding the Gibson
correlation. Strong co—movement between the inverse relative price of gold (and
other metals) on the one hand, and the real interest rate on the other,
characterizes non—gold standard years as well. The price level during the Gibson
Paradox period nearly followed a random walk, as do real metals prices today.
The limited evidence on monetary and nonmonetary stocks of gold is consistent
with the notion that changes in nonmonetary demand were an important determinant
of the supply of metal to the monetary sector during the classical gold standard
yearsL Finally, as also noted by Friedman and Schwartz (1982), the only extended
period clearly characterized by the Gibson correlation is precisely the era of
the gold standard.
Although there is little evidence of any trends in pre—1930 prices, the
price level during the gold standard years was anything but stable. Jumps in
the price level, in either direction, were the rule rather than the exception.
In addition to rationalizing Gibson's Paradox, the asset price approach to the
gold standard of this paper accounts for the very substantial volatility of the
price level in this period.
The production of new gold undoubtedly played a major role in the history
of prices. Yet the amount of new gold extracted in a year never exceeded two or
three percent of the total stock. Thus factors impinging on agents' willingness—31—
to hold the existing stock must not be neglected. It has long been clear that
the effect of changes in the rate of interest on ordinary monetary velocity is
insufficient to account for the Gibson Paradox. The broader view of gold as a
durable real asset in this paper may well provide the necessary missing link.-32—
Notes
1. Following the suggestion of Homer (1977) and Shiller and Siegel (1977), we
use the yields on 23 percent government annuities for the years 1881 to 1888,
instead of consol yields. During this period, yields had fallen below the 3
percent rate at which consols were issued, and the possibility of government
redemption (which occurred in the "refunding of 1888") kept the yields on
consols from falling much further.
2. Figure 2, which shows the 3—month treasury bill rate alongside the level of
the CPI and a six—month moving average of inflation, extends a similar chart
presented in Friedman and Schwartz (1976).
3. Barsky (1984) considers the possibility that inflation was significantly more
forecastable with a larger information set. While it is impossible to give
a fully satisfactory treatment of this issue with the limited data available,
it remains true that there is little evidence of a rational Fisherian premium
in nominal interest rates prior to 1914.
4. Benjamin and Kochin, working in the framework of Barro, argue that tran-
sitorily high government purchases per se raise interest rates, whether
financed by debt or by current taxes.
5. From thecontext,it is clear that Cagan means the monetary gold stock.
6. An anticipated rise in r is easily worked out. The initial jump in P and i
(at the announcement of higher real rates in the future) and the correlation
across steady states, are identical to the unanticipated case.
7. A nearly vertical G =0locus means that the responsiveness of supply to
price has only a small effect on the steady state gold stock.
8. In quarterly data from 1973:1 to 1984:2 ,thefirst 5 autocorrelations of the
change in the log real gold price are .10, —.06, .33, .08, and —.19, with an
asymptotic standard error of .15.
9. The reader might wonder whether this conclusion would be overturned by con-
sidering a "world" real gold price. We constructed one, using the trade—
weighted real exchange value of the dollar series supplied by the Federal
Reserve. Through 1982, the results were almost identical. In the last three
years, the large real appreciation of the dollar caused the dollar real price
of gold to be considerably lower than the world real price. Note, however,
that real interest rates have been considerably higher in the U.S. than in
the rest of the world by almost any measure..—33—
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